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Williams Lake and Mikisew Cree:
Update on Fiduciary Duty and the
Honour of the Crown
Richard Ogden

I. INTRODUCTION
This article considers the Supreme Court’s two Aboriginal law
decisions of 2018. They are not ground-breaking: the first applies
existing Aboriginal law jurisprudence, and the second limits the
application of existing jurisprudence. Neither case says anything
fundamental about the nature of reconciliation or the honour of the
Crown. When seen together, however, they show a court that is invested
in reconciliation but wanting to limit its role in achieving reconciliation.
The first and second parts of the article examine the cases’ key
findings. By way of overview here, in Williams Lake the Supreme Court
applied and affirmed existing case law on Crown fiduciary duties to
Indigenous Peoples, and considered the role of the Specific Claims
Tribunal in addressing pre-Confederation breaches of those duties.1 In
Mikisew Cree, the Court held that it could not review the introduction of
Bills to Parliament under the Federal Court Act, and went on to
conclude, technically in obiter, that the development and passage of
primary legislation does not trigger a duty to consult.2 However, the
reasons of five judges in that case support the conclusion that the Crown
can have a duty to consult with section 35 rights-holders prior to

Counsel, Crown Law Office — Civil, Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General. This article
was prepared for the 2019 Osgoode Constitutional Cases Conference. The views expressed in this article
are mine and should not be taken to be those of my employer. I would like to thank Craig Scott, Patricia
Burke Wood, Scott Franks, Manizeh Fancy, and Sonia Lawrence for helpful comments on an earlier draft,
and Lisa La Horey for related discussions, although any errors remain mine. In case the author ever finishes
his PhD at the University of Cambridge, this article contains research carried out for that degree.
1
Williams Lake Indian Band v. Canada (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development),
[2018] S.C.J. No. 4, 2018 SCC 4 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Williams Lake”].
2
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Governor in Council), [2018] S.C.J. No. 40, 2018
SCC 40 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mikisew Cree”].
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adopting subordinate legislation. In addition, three judges stated that the
Crown may have a duty to deal honourably with section 35 rightsholders in relation to the passage of primary legislation. The reasons of
two further judges suggest they would support such a duty.
The third and final part of the article explores briefly the relationship
between reconciliation and the doctrine of the honour of the Crown. It
notes how, in these two cases, the Supreme Court applied the doctrine in
a manner that would advance reconciliation while respecting the limited
role of the courts. The article concludes by suggesting that the Supreme
Court will use the honour of the Crown to advance reconciliation, but in
doing so will not stray beyond the functions it commonly performs
outside of the Aboriginal law context, such as judicial review of
administrative action and of legislative interference with constitutionally
protected rights.

II. WILLIAMS LAKE
This case addressed the federal Specific Claims Tribunal (“Tribunal”)
and potential breaches by the Crown of the fiduciary duty it owes First
Nations in the creation of reserves. The Tribunal is a statutory body that
considers First Nations’ allegations of historical Crown wrongdoing. The
Tribunal can order compensation for any such wrongdoing up to $150
million but cannot award land.
1. Facts
In mid-19th century British Columbia, colonial encroachment
threatened First Nations’ land. In response, the colony enacted a law
protecting First Nations’ settlements. This law applied to land which
Williams Lake First Nation (“Williams Lake”) occupied as a village site
(“Village Lands”). Before British Columbia entered into Confederation,
Williams Lake was dispossessed of the Village Lands by colonial
settlement. Soon after Confederation, Canada chose not to return the
Village Lands to Williams Lake, which it could have done by cancelling
rights of pre-emption to the Village Lands that non-Indigenous people,
including the local land commissioner, had acquired contrary to law.
Instead, Canada offered Williams Lake less desirable land, which
Williams Lake accepted. These circumstances were the basis of Williams
Lake’s complaint to the Tribunal.
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The Tribunal found in favour of Williams Lake, holding that the
actions of the colony of British Columbia were a breach of the Imperial
Crown’s fiduciary duty.3 It held that Canada could be liable for this
breach. It also held that Canada’s inaction after Confederation was a
breach of the Crown’s fiduciary duty. On judicial review, the Federal
Court of Appeal held that the Tribunal’s decision was unreasonable.4
Williams Lake appealed to the Supreme Court, which by majority
allowed the appeal and restored the Tribunal’s decision.
The Supreme Court held that before Confederation, the Imperial
Crown owed a fiduciary duty to Williams Lake to protect the Village
Lands, and then breached that duty by failing to protect those lands. The
Court held that the Tribunal’s conclusion that it has jurisdiction to find
Canada liable for such pre-Confederation breaches was reasonable.
Finally, it held that after Confederation, Canada owed a fiduciary duty in
respect of those lands, and then breached that duty by not establishing
those lands as a reserve. There were three sets of reasons. As discussed
further below, the judges agreed on the first question, but parted ways on
the second and third.
2. Fiduciary Duty

The decision confirms existing law on Crown fiduciary duties to
Indigenous Peoples.5 In this part of the article I summarize the
legal findings in Williams Lake, and in the last part I return to the
case to consider some implications that may be drawn from it.
(a) Overview of Crown Fiduciary Duties
There are two main types of fiduciary duty that the Crown can owe to
Indigenous Peoples. The first type is the sui generis fiduciary duty, which
arises from the honour of the Crown and the Crown’s assumption of
discretionary control over specific “Aboriginal” interests. A sui generis
fiduciary duty in respect of Aboriginal interests in lands, prior to creation
of a reserve, includes the duties of good faith, loyalty, and full disclosure
3

2014 SCTC 3.
Canada v. Williams Lake Indian Band, [2016] F.C.J. No. 237, 2016 FCA 63 (F.C.A.).
5
For a summary of that law prior to Williams Lake see Jamie D. Dickson, The Honour and
Dishonour of the Crown: Making Sense of Aboriginal Law in Canada (Saskatoon: Purich
Publishing, 2015).
4
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of information. When meeting such a duty the Crown can take into
account its obligations to others, including the general public.6
The second type is the ad hoc or general fiduciary duty, which arises
from: (1) a Crown undertaking to an Indigenous community to act in its
best interests; (2) the community’s corresponding vulnerability; and (3) a
legal or substantial practical interest of the community that can be
adversely affected by the Crown’s discretion or control. Crown ad hoc
fiduciary duties are rare — the Crown’s responsibility for the public
interest means that it rarely will be found to have assumed a paramount
obligation to an Indigenous community to act in its best interests.7
(b) Standard of Review
All judges agreed that the standard of review of the Tribunal’s
decision was reasonableness, not correctness.8 In particular, the majority
held that the Tribunal’s decision did not depend on the resolution of a
constitutional issue in the terms contemplated in Dunsmuir.9 They held
that the Crown’s fiduciary duty to Indigenous Peoples was, in this
context, a common law duty.10 I will return to this point in the final part
of the article.
(c) Existence and Breach of Pre- and Post-Confederation Duties
All judges held that it was reasonable for the Tribunal to conclude that
the Imperial Crown in the form of British Columbia owed a sui generis
fiduciary duty to Williams Lake to protect its interest in the Village
Lands before Confederation.11 The Imperial Crown’s failure to protect
the Village Lands was a breach of this duty. They did not consider
whether the Crown owed an ad hoc duty before Confederation.
Seven judges agreed that after Confederation, Canada owed and
breached a sui generis fiduciary duty to Williams Lake.12 Canada could
have secured the Village Lands for the First Nation, including by
6

Williams Lake, at para. 55.
Id., at para. 163.
Id., at paras. 26-27, 138, 160.
9
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, 2008 SCC 9, at paras. 58-61; Williams
Lake, at paras. 27-29.
10
Id., at paras. 27-35, 88.
11
Id., at paras. 67-68, 133, 179.
12
Id., at paras. 74-89, 134.
7
8
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cancelling the settlers’ rights of pre-emption. Canada’s offer of other, less
desirable lands was a breach of the duty. The majority did not consider
whether an ad hoc duty was owed by Canada. Justice Brown (McLachlin
C.J.C. concurring) dissented on this issue of post-Confederation
fiduciary duty, holding that Canada had not owed an ad hoc duty, and
had owed but did not breach a sui generis fiduciary duty.
(d) Expansion of Existing Law
Although the reasons do not establish any new principles in respect of
Crown fiduciary duties, they confirm and expand on three points worth
noting. First, a sui generis duty requires that the relevant Aboriginal interest
be sufficiently independent of Crown executive and legislative functions to
invoke Crown responsibility in the nature of a private law duty. If the proper
description of an obligation is that it is “public” in nature, for example
because it primarily concerns public interests, then it cannot give rise to a
fiduciary duty. In the present case the Aboriginal interest was Williams
Lake’s pre-existing interest in the use and occupation of the Village Lands.
Such an interest was sufficient to give rise to a sui generis fiduciary duty,
even if the interest did not rise to the level of Aboriginal title.13
Second, the Crown’s obligation under a sui generis fiduciary duty is to
balance the Indigenous community’s best interests against the interests of
other people or groups for which the Crown is responsible, including the
broader public. The majority described this as a Crown obligation to act
“with respect to the best interests of” the Indigenous People (emphasis
added).14 In contrast, the obligation under an ad hoc fiduciary duty engages
a more traditional fiduciary obligation to act “in the best interests” of the
beneficiary (emphasis added).15 Further, the Crown’s obligation when
balancing interests under a sui generis duty is to “reconcile them fairly”.16
Third, the relevant Indigenous interest that gives rise to and is the
subject of the fiduciary duty must be carefully identified, as this is the
interest to be balanced against non-Indigenous interests.17 In Williams
13

Id., at paras. 52, 54, 67-68.
Id., at para. 51. Compare Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004]
S.C.J. No. 70, 2004 SCC 73, at, para. 18 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haida Nation”], which used variants
of both formulations. It said that the Crown's obligation was to act “with reference to the Aboriginal
group's best interests” and to “act in the Aboriginal group’s best interests”.
15
Id., at paras. 44, 162.
16
Id., at paras. 55, 110.
17
Id., at paras. 52, 60, 64.
14
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Lake, the relevant interest was the Village Lands. Seven judges held that
it was reasonable for the Tribunal to conclude that Canada’s offer of
alternative reserve lands was not a fair reconciliation between nonIndigenous interests and Williams Lake’s best interests in respect of the
Village Lands.18 The two dissenting judges held that this was not a
reasonable conclusion. In their view, the Tribunal made an error in not
considering whether the alternative reserve lands were in the best interests of
Williams Lake, seen in the context of what Canada could reasonably have
achieved for Williams Lake in a timely manner.19 The opposing conclusions
on this point indicate different ways of determining the First Nation’s
perspective as to what were its best interests at the time of breach. The
minority referred to evidence of what the First Nation claimed at the time of
breach that it wanted, and also to what the Crown could reasonably achieve
in the context of the times. The majority seems to have prioritized the land
which was the subject of the breach and which is claimed, i.e., sought by the
First Nation in the present. While both the majority and minority might
assert they are looking to what the First Nation wanted, the majority appears
to have given more weight to the present Indigenous perspective.
3. Present-Day Crown Responsibility for Pre-Confederation
Breach
The majority held that it was reasonable for the Tribunal to conclude
that Canada could, under the Specific Claims Tribunal Act,20 be found
liable for a pre-Confederation breach of fiduciary duty.21 The legal issue
was whether under section 14(2) of that Act a colonial liability or
obligation, such as a fiduciary duty, could be said to have become the
“responsibility” of Canada. In finding in favour of liability, the majority
gave reasons that it said were “supplementary” to those of the Tribunal
on this point. These reasons relied in part on the “Indigenous
perspective” on the interpretation of the legislation, and the principle that
courts should adopt a large, liberal and purposive interpretation of
legislation relating to Indigenous Peoples and should resolve uncertainty
in their favour.22 The majority held that, in the context of legislation
designed to facilitate resolution of claims relating to historical breaches
18
19
20
21
22

Id., at paras. 74-89.
Id., at paras. 173-177.
S.C. 2008, c. 22.
Id., at para. 131.
Id., at para. 130.
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of fiduciary duty by the Crown to Indigenous Peoples, Canada could be
said to be “responsible” under the Act for pre-Confederation breaches.
This conclusion was informed by the majority’s view that claims for
historic breach of fiduciary duty are often barred from the courts by
limitations statutes, but that a “just resolution of these types of claims is
essential to the process of reconciliation”.23
The two minority decisions would have returned this question to the
Tribunal. Justice Rowe held that the Tribunal had not provided any
reasons on this point that the majority could properly be said to be
“supplementing”.24 Justice Brown held that the theory on which the
Tribunal ostensibly found Canada to be liable was not a reasonable
interpretation of section 14(2). He also held that the majority’s
interpretive approaches were not available because the authorities on
which the majority relied dealt with ambiguous or inconclusive
provisions whereas, in his view, section 14(2) was neither.25 On this
point, then, Brown J. (and McLachlin C.J.C.) did not see ambiguity,
while the majority did. The majority’s decision may indicate increased
judicial willingness to consider and adopt an interpretation of a provision
which, where reasonably available, supports an Indigenous perspective
of that provision.
The conclusion that Canada can be liable in the Specific Claims
context for pre-Confederation breaches by the Imperial Crown for the
latter’s fiduciary duty to First Nations may provide greater incentive for
First Nations to commence claims in that forum rather than civil courts.
On the other hand, given the $150 million cap and the Tribunal’s
inability to make in rem orders in land, a substantial reduction in the
number of civil claims is unlikely.

III. MIKISEW CREE
While Williams Lake considered the remedying of historical Crown
wrongs, Mikisew Cree looked at the manner in which the Crown in the
present reconciles Indigenous and non-Indigenous interests in the process
of making legislation. The narrow question in this case was whether the
Crown can owe a duty to consult in the development and passage of

23
24
25

Id., at para. 2.
Id., at paras. 146, 155.
Id., at para. 206.
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primary legislation. However, the broader, underlying issue was the
extent of procedural limits on law-making in relation to section 35 rights.
The basic characteristics of the duty to consult and accommodate are
well settled. Specifically, a duty to consult arises where the Crown has
actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of a section 35 right
and contemplates an action that may adversely impact that right. A duty
to accommodate arises where the Crown determines that an adverse
impact is likely. Accommodation is a process of proportionate balancing
of the impact on the section 35 right with the public interest that the
Crown decision seeks to advance.26
The consultation and accommodation process must be reasonable; it
need not be perfect.27 The ultimate question is what is required to
maintain the honour of the Crown.28 Remedies for breach include
quashing the decision at issue, granting injunctive relief, damages, or an
order to carry out consultation prior to proceeding further with the
proposed action.29
1. Facts
In 2012, the federal Minister of Finance introduced into Parliament
two omnibus bills with significant effects on Canada’s environmental
protection regime. Mikisew Cree First Nation (“Mikisew”) filed a
judicial review application in the Federal Court, alleging that the Crown
had a duty to consult Mikisew on the basis that the amendments had the
potential to adversely affect their Treaty 8 rights, but they had not been
consulted by Canada. The Federal Court held that the decision was
reviewable under the Federal Court Act and that a duty was triggered.30
At the Federal Court of Appeal a majority concluded that there was no
jurisdiction to review parliamentary legislative action.31 The majority
also held that the doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty, separation of
powers, and parliamentary privilege precluded a duty to consult.
Mikisew appealed to the Supreme Court.
26

Haida Nation, at paras. 35 and 47-50 (S.C.C.); Mikisew Cree, at paras. 3, 25 (S.C.C.).
Haida Nation, at paras. 62-63 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 45.
29
Mikisew Cree, at para. 39 (S.C.C.).
30
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development), [2014] F.C.J. No. 1308, 2014 FC 1244 (F.C.).
31
Canada (Governor General in Council) v. Mikisew Cree First Nation, [2016] F.C.J. No. 1389,
[2017] 3 F.C.R. 298, 2016 FCA 311 (F.C.A.).
27
28
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All nine judges held that the Federal Court cannot review the actions
of federal ministers in the parliamentary legislative process.
Nevertheless, the Court proceeded to consider extensively, in what are
technically obiter statements, whether there was a duty to consult.
A majority of seven judges held that the development of legislation does
not trigger a duty to consult. Justice Karakatsanis (Wagner C.J.C. and
Gascon J. concurring) held that the duty does not apply to Parliament
because the separation of powers makes it inappropriate for the courts to
interfere in the law-making process.32 In her view, the duty to consult is a
particular administrative law remedy by which courts can review
executive decision-making.33 Further, the duty gives rise to particular
processes developed in case law, and particular remedies, which are
appropriate to executive activity but not to the law-making activity of
Parliament.34
Justice Brown held that the enactment of legislation, including Crown
assent, was not Crown action and so could not give rise to a duty to
consult. He also held that the honour of the Crown did not apply to the
enactment of legislation.35 Justice Rowe (Moldaver and Côté JJ.
concurring) agreed with Brown J.’s reasons on these points.36 In the
minority on this issue, Abella J. (Martin J. concurring) held that the
honour of the Crown applied to all Crown action, including
parliamentary law-making.37 She concluded that the separation of powers
did not mean that the duty to consult was an inappropriate means to
32
Mikisew Cree, at paras. 2, 32 (S.C.C.). Compare the recent New Zealand Supreme Court
decision in Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei Trust v. Attorney General, [2018] NZSC 84. The Trust had settled
a historic Ngāti Whātua grievance with the Crown, and the settlement gave it rights of first refusal
over certain Crown-owned land. The settlement was implemented by legislation. Subsequently, the
Crown proposed in a settlement with a different iwi (tribe) to transfer that same land to the second
iwi, and to implement that latter settlement in legislation. The Trust sought a declaration of its rights
of first refusal under the first settlement legislation. The Crown argued that such a declaration would
impinge on the legislative process, as the executive had announced that the second settlement would
be implemented by legislation. The Supreme Court rejected that argument and granted the
declaration. It held that the “determination of present right of itself” was not an interference with
proceedings in Parliament [para. 115]. In other words, statements by the executive that the law
would be changed by legislation in a specific way that would affect the rights of an Indigenous
community did not mark a “no-go area” for the courts. See further Dean R. Knight “New Zealand:
Treaty of Waitangi settlements and the principle of non-interference with Parliamentary proceedings
— Ngati Whatua Orakei Trust v. Attorney General, [2018] NZSC 84, Westlaw New Zealand Public
Law, January 2019, at 218-20.
33
Mikisew Cree, at paras. 38-39, 49 (S.C.C.).
34
Id., at para. 39.
35
Id., at paras. 136, 144.
36
Id., at paras. 102, 117, 126-133.
37
Id., at para. 55.
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uphold the honour of the Crown in respect of parliamentary lawmaking.38 However, it did mean that judicial remedies should only be
available after the passage of legislation.39 Further, while invalidation of
legislation was a possible remedy, a declaration of breach of the duty to
consult was more suitable.40
2. Substantive Limit — Justification of Infringement
This ruling does not mean that the Crown never has to consult before
enacting legislation. As Mikisew Cree confirmed, the Crown must justify
legislation that infringes a section 35 right.41 If the Crown cannot justify
the infringement, then the legislation will be invalid. An infringement
can be justified only where it is (1) based on a compelling and
substantive legislative objective, and (2) consistent with the honour of
the Crown and the Crown’s fiduciary obligation to the Indigenous
community.42
The majority reasons in Mikisew Cree stated that prior consultation by
the Crown was an “important part” or a “factor” in justifying
infringement.43 This characterization of consultation in the justification
test marked a slight shift from the proposition in Tsilhqot’in Nation that
prior consultation is a formal, stand-alone part of the justification test
that must always be satisfied,44 although it could also be seen as a return
to earlier jurisprudence which had said it was one of the considerations.45
Justice Abella, the only judge who held that there was a duty to consult
on the passage of legislation, was also the only judge to rely on
38
39
40
41

(S.C.C.).

Id., at paras. 81-83, 91.
Id., at para. 93.
Id., at paras. 97-98.
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, 2014 SCC 44, at para. 104

42
The interference with the Aboriginal interest must also be proportionate to the legislative
objective, and courts must consider the future interest of the Aboriginal group in the right in
question. This latter consideration makes the test more onerous than the test for justifying
infringements of Charter rights and freedoms. It is worth noting that the legislature cannot use the
“notwithstanding” provision in s. 33 of the Charter to bypass a Crown failure to justify an
infringement, as s. 33 does not apply to the rights guaranteed by s. 35.
43
Mikisew Cree, at paras. 48, 152, 154, 167 (S.C.C.).
44
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, 2014 SCC 44, at paras. 77,
125 (S.C.C.). See further Peter Hogg and Daniel Styler, “Statutory Limitation of Aboriginal Rights:
What Counts as Justification?” (2015-2016) 1 Lakehead Law Journal 1, at 12.
45
See for example, Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R.
1010, at para. 168 (S.C.C.): “relevant to determining whether the infringement … is justified”.
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Tsilhqot’in Nation and to conclude that consultation was a separate
requirement in the justification analysis and not merely a factor.46
Technically this means that although consultation is not necessary for
justification, the Crown’s failure to consult at all would make
justification of infringement unlikely. This gives the Crown a “strong
incentive” to consult prior to legislating.47 As Brown J. said, there is
“value and wisdom” in consulting prior to enacting legislation that “has
the potential to adversely impact the exercise of Aboriginal or treaty
rights”.48
3. Duty to Consult on Subordinate Legislation
The reasons of five judges suggest that a duty to consult may arise
prior to the passage of subordinate legislation, such as regulations or
rules. Justice Abella found that a duty to consult could arise in respect of
all law-making, which necessarily includes secondary, or subordinate,
legislation.49 Justice Karakatsanis held that although there was no duty in
respect of primary legislation, this conclusion did not apply to
subordinate legislation “as such conduct is clearly executive rather than
parliamentary”.50
It is worth considering what such a duty would — or could — entail.
Whether a duty arises, its content, and whether it has been satisfied, will
likely depend on the particular facts of each executive law-making
action. Below I consider each of these questions in turn.
(a) When Would the Duty Arise?
As stated earlier, a duty to consult arises where an executive action
has the potential to adversely impact a proven or credibly-asserted
section 35 right. The formal designation of the proposed subordinate
legislation would likely not matter.51
46

Mikisew Cree, at para. 77 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 155, per Rowe J.
48
Id., at para. 145, per Brown J.
49
Id., at paras. 55-57, 62-63, 76.
50
Id., at para. 51.
51
In Ontario, statutory instruments are divided into those that are and those that are not
“regulations” within the meaning of Part III of the Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sch. F.
These must be filed with the Office of the Registrar of Regulations, generally after approval by the
Lieutenant Governor in Council, a specified minister, or a specified body. What an instrument is
called in a statute (e.g., “regulation”, “rule”, “directive”) does not determine whether it is or is not a
47
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In my view, subordinate legislation that is in substance intended to
limit the exercise of the particular section 35 rights of a particular
Indigenous community is most likely to trigger a duty. Legislation that is
intended to limit the exercise of particular section 35 rights held by
Indigenous communities in general is less likely to trigger a duty.
Legislation that has as an incidental effect a potential limit on the
exercise of section 35 rights is further less likely. It is important to bear
in mind that the threshold for a duty is low.52
The other part of the equation is the section 35 right at issue. Again in
my view, a duty to consult is more likely where the right is established in
a treaty or is a credible assertion of Aboriginal title. A duty is less likely
where the right is an unproven but asserted Aboriginal right in relation to
a particular place, such as a right to protect an important cultural site.
This is because the right is not yet established as a matter of fact. A duty
is even less likely where the asserted but unproven right is of a
jurisdictional nature, as the Supreme Court has defined such rights very
narrowly.53 It is important to emphasize that the assertion need only be
credible.54
Assuming the proposed regulation would have an adverse impact,
there is also a question of when in the process the duty to consult would
be triggered. There is a good argument that the duty would be triggered
when the Crown considers the use of subordinate legislation, since that is
the proposed Crown action with the potential to have adverse impacts.
There would need to be a real consideration of the use of subordinate
legislation, and real consideration of policy alternatives which could
form the content of that subordinate legislation. Accordingly, there is a
good argument that a duty may arise in the policy development stage,
prior to drafting of the subordinate legislation. At the same time, the
potential impact on section 35 rights from subordinate legislation must
be more than speculative: it must be a chain of facts and inferences,
joined together by logic.55

Part III “regulation”. For example, the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 made under
s. 66 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 are Part III “regulations”.
52
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J.
No. 71, 2005 SCC 69, at paras. 34, 55 (S.C.C.).
53
R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] S.C.J. No. 20, [1996], 2 S.C.R. 821, at paras. 24, 27 (S.C.C.).
54
Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, [2010] S.C.J. No. 43, 2010 SCC
43, at para. 40 (S.C.C.).
55
Hupacasath First Nation v. Canada (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada),
[2015] F.C.J. No. 4, 2015 FCA 4, at para. 117 (F.C.A.).
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If the duty arises at the policy development stage, assuming the use of
regulation is a real consideration, it may be acceptable to consult on the
policy, and not always necessary to consult on a formal draft regulation.56
Even if a duty were triggered at the policy development stage the
Crown generally has until the Crown decision has been made to
complete adequate consultation. That means the Crown could consult up
until the subordinate legislation becomes law, although this may not
foreclose a court stepping in prior to that point if requested.
(b) With Whom Would the Crown Consult?
The duty to consult requires the Crown to consult with section 35
right-holders. Where proposed subordinate legislation is specifically
directed at a particular Indigenous community the Crown is more likely
to have a duty to consult directly with that community. However, in the
context of subordinate legislation that is cast more broadly, this could
pose obvious practical challenges: consulting separately with every
section 35 right-holding community could be very costly and timeconsuming.
However, it is important to bear in mind that the standard for
satisfaction of the duty is reasonableness. For example, it may not be
necessary to meet in-person with every section 35 right-holding
community in every circumstance. Where the legislation is expressed in
general terms, and the potential for adverse impacts is similarly general,
notice to each community and a reasonable means for individual
communities to express their views about the potential impacts may
suffice. In appropriate circumstances, notice could, if the community has
advised in advance, be through a representative organization such as a
tribal council or provincial territorial organization. The communities’
responses could similarly be channelled through a representative
organization. That said, and although such efforts could work, there is a
good argument that the Crown could have an obligation to hold a
meeting with a community that wished to meet in person, depending on
the particular proposed legislation.

56
Postings on the Environmental Registry of Ontario do not have to include the draft
regulation itself, but rather merely the proposed content of the regulation, i.e., the gist of the
regulation.
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(c) Reliance on Existing Processes
As a general proposition, the Crown can rely on pre-existing
regulatory processes to satisfy a duty to consult.57 However, the extent of
consultation required is case-specific and so flexibility is needed. An
obvious point is that time to undertake additional consultation
requirements may have to be built into the process.58
The following considerations may arise when using existing
processes. First, the Crown has an obligation to provide notice. Second,
the obligation is to consult about the potential impacts on the rights, and
not just about the environmental, physical, or social impacts.59 Existing
processes may be limited to discussions about environmental impacts.
Third, the honour of the Crown may require additional efforts. These
may include such actions as providing additional time, capacity
support,60 offering meetings, the development of additional materials
including discussion guides to solicit detailed feedback, and sharing of
draft legislation under “lock-down” conditions. Fourth, the potential for
adverse impacts may require a “moderate” or a “deep” level of
consultation with obligations to meet separately with each community, to
provide written responses to its concerns, to respond with potential
alternative plans that reflect the consultation, and even to involve the
community in the process of deciding whether to adopt the proposed
legislation.61
4. Procedural Limit — The Honour of the Crown
The proposition that the Crown must act honourably when enacting
primary legislation that has the potential to adversely impact section 35
rights was raised only by Karakatsanis J. and was not directly before the
57
See Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director),
[2004] S.C.J. No. 69, 2004 SCC 74, at para. 40 (S.C.C.).
58
For potential processes see Ontario’s Regulatory Registry for proposed regulations with
an impact on business, online: <http://www.ontariocanada.com/registry/>; the Environmental
Registry of Ontario for environmental legislation, regulations, policies and instruments, has
proposal, review and consideration, and decision stages, online: <https://ero.ontario.ca/>, ) under the
Environmental Bill of Rights, 1993, S.O. 1993, c. 28; and the Ontario Consultations Directory,
online: <https://www.ontario.ca/page/consultations-directory>.
59
Hamlet of Clyde River v. Petroleum Geo-Services Inc., [2017] S.C.J. No. 40, 2017 SCC
40, at para. 45 (S.C.C.).
60
Id., at paras. 48-49; Saugeen First Nation v. Ontario (MNRF), [2017] O.J. No. 3701,
2017 ONSC 3456, at paras. 156-160 (Ont. S.C.J.).
61
Id., at paras. 41-52.
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Court. Justice Karakatsanis and, in response, Brown J. discussed the
question in some depth. Since this issue may be raised before a court at
some point in the near future, it is worth considering here.
(a) The Honour of the Crown
The honour of the Crown is a foundational principle in Aboriginal
law.62 It arose on the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over what is now
Canada and describes the standard the Crown must attain when meeting
its constitutional obligations to Indigenous Peoples.63 Its purpose is the
reconciliation of Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians in a
mutually-respectful long-term relationship.64
Because it is a foundational principle, the honour of the Crown can
give rise to particular obligations, such as the duty to consult and
accommodate, where such obligations are necessary to uphold the
Crown’s honour. In addition, it may be that the Crown has, as
Karakatsanis J. described, a “duty of honourable dealing”.65 In this sense,
the honour of the Crown “governs” the relationship,66 controlling and not
just guiding it.
Remedies for breach of the honour of the Crown can vary. In
Manitoba Metis the Court granted a declaration that the Crown had
breached its honour when satisfying its constitutional obligation to Métis
under the Manitoba Act, 1871.67 Where the honour of the Crown gives
rise to other obligations, such as the duty to consult, a court may
invalidate the Crown decision or even award damages.68

62
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J.
No. 71, 2005 SCC 69, at para. 21 (S.C.C.).
63
Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] S.C.J. No. 14,
2013 SCC 14, at paras. 70-73 (S.C.C.).
64
Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, [2010] S.C.J. No. 53, 2010 SCC 53, at
para. 42 (S.C.C.); Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), id., at paras. 66-67.
65
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J.
No. 71, 2005 SCC 69, at para. 47 (S.C.C.). See also paras. 137, 141, per Brown J. Reference to a
broad “duty of honourable dealing” first appears in Haida Nation, at para. 32 (S.C.C.).
66
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J.
No. 71, 2005 SCC 69, at paras. 21, 55 (S.C.C.). See also para. 28.
67
Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] S.C.J. No. 14,
2013 SCC 14, at para. 143 (S.C.C.).
68
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J.
No. 71, 2005 SCC 69, at para. 39 (S.C.C.).
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(b) Honourable Legislating?
Comparison of the reasons of Karakatsanis and Abella JJ. shows that
they largely agree about the existence of a Crown obligation to act
honourably when passing legislation. On the main issue in Mikisew Cree
— the duty to consult — Karakatsanis J. held that the “duty to consult
doctrine”, with its particular processes, was developed to address
executive decision-making and so was not suitable to the parliamentary
legislative process. She did not conclude that the honour of the Crown
does not apply to that law-making process, rather she appeared to take it
for granted that it does apply:69
The constitutional principles — such as the separation of powers and
parliamentary sovereignty ― that preclude the application of the duty
to consult during the legislative process do not absolve the Crown of its
duty to act honourably…

She further wrote that the most likely remedy for breach of any duty of
honourable dealing in the passage of primary legislation would be a
declaration,70 although she did not rule out other remedies including
invalidity.71
The analysis of Karakatsanis J. was framed in the hypothetical, and
she was careful to equivocate on whether a remedy might be available at
all.72 But this equivocation should be taken as mild judicial caution rather
than as strong doubt on her part. It is difficult to see a court concluding if
a proper case came before it that the Crown had breached a duty to act
honourably with respect to section 35 interests, but then declining to
issue, at the very least, a declaration to that effect.73
Justice Abella held that the honour of the Crown applied to all Crown
action, including parliamentary law-making. In concluding that there was
a duty to consult, she held that the Crown’s honour is engaged where a
proposed law has the potential to adversely affect section 35 rights. She
limited availability of relief for breach of the duty to consult until after
69
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J.
No. 71, 2005 SCC 69, at para. 52 (S.C.C.).
70
Id., at para. 47. See also para. 97.
71
Id., at para. 6. See also para. 46 where Karakatsanis J. cited s. 52(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982 when discussing an example of potential breach of such a duty.
72
Id., at para. 3.
73
Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] S.C.J. No. 14,
2013 SCC 14, at para. 143 (S.C.C.): “…A declaration is a narrow remedy. It is available without a
cause of action, and courts make declarations whether or not any consequential relief is available…
In some cases, declaratory relief may be the only way to give effect to the honour of the Crown…”
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the legislation was enacted, and held that even at that point a declaration
was the more suitable remedy.74
In summary, the only difference between Karakatsanis and Abella JJ.
was whether the legislature is bound by the particular processes
developed in jurisprudence about the duty to consult on executive
decision-making:
•

Both concluded that the honour of the Crown applies to
parliamentary law-making and may be engaged by legislation that
adversely affects section 35 rights.

•

Justice Karakatsanis only suggested that a court could review
legislation for breach of the honour of the Crown after it was passed,
while Abella J. determined clearly that it could.

•

Both concluded that the likely remedy for breach of the honour of
the Crown in the legislative process was a declaration but that a
breach might also result in invalidity of the legislation at issue.

Justice Brown disagreed with the proposition that legislation could be
reviewed for consistency with the Crown’s honour in the absence of an
infringement, i.e., outside of a “Sparrow” analysis. Justice Rowe agreed
with that conclusion.
But it is clear that Brown J. understood the proposition. He recognized
the similarity between the reasons of Karakatsanis J. and Abella J. He said
that accepting Karakatsanis J.’s proposition would result in the “obligation
which the Mikisew Cree First Nation asks the Court to impose” in the
appeal actually before the Court.75 In his view, Karakatsanis J:.76
…leave[s] open the possibility that validly enacted legislation (which
has not been or could not be the subject of a s. 35 infringement claim)
might be declared to be “not consistent with [the honour of the
Crown]” due to some failure to uphold the honour of the Crown…
[She], in substance, proceeds to treat the honour of the Crown as the
potential source of an enforceable obligation on legislators to either
refrain from passing certain legislation because it “affects” rights writ
large, or not to do so without consultation.

74
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J.
No. 71, 2005 SCC 69, at paras. 93, 96-98 (S.C.C.).
75
Id., at para. 141.
76
Id., at paras. 140, 143; see also para. 104.
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…legislators [are], in essence, being told that they cannot enact
legislation that “affects” (but does not infringe) certain rights that might
exist...
[original emphasis]

Justice Brown said that the “honour of the Crown does not bind
Parliament”,77 and that “judicial review of the legislative process,
including post-facto review of the process of legislative enactment, for
adherence to s. 35 and for consistency with the honour of the Crown, is
unconstitutional”.78 Assuming Brown J. was talking about general review
of legislation by judges, and not specifically judicial review with
administrative law remedies, then neither of these statements is accurate:
the honour of the Crown requires the Crown to justify a legislative
infringement of section 35 rights.79
Further, the basis for his conclusion was his assertion that the
“Crown” does not make legislation. Whatever the merit for this assertion
that may exist outside of the field of Aboriginal law, there is little merit
for it within that field. In Aboriginal law, the concept of the “Crown”
represents the entirety of the legal system which Indigenous Peoples did
not share when the Crown first asserted sovereignty, but to which they
became subject over time.80 It is the Crown writ large with whom
reconciliation must occur.
In rejecting a legislative duty to act honourably, Brown J. was
concerned that legislators would be left without certainty as to the
constitutionality of regular, general legislation, including budget
legislation.81 Indeed, the sphere of unimpeded legislative capacity is
greater if courts review only legislation that actually does infringe
section 35 rights, and not legislation that only adversely affects them, or
had the potential to do so. However, in my view Brown J. overstated
77

Id., at para. 136.
Id., at para. 144.
79
Id., at para. 48 per Karakatsanis J.; R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990], 1 S.C.R.
1075, at 1114 (S.C.C.). Justice Brown appeared to recognize this immediately after making the
second statement. He said that judicial review was only appropriate after the passage of legislation,
in respect of a challenge to its substance rather than the manner in which it was passed. That is also
wrong, since the justification test requires the Crown to consider the manner in which the legislation
was passed. It is also, perhaps, an exception that proves the rule that the honour of the Crown can
bind Parliament.
80
Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] S.C.J. No. 14,
2013 SCC 14, at para. 67 (S.C.C.).
81
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J.
No. 71, 2005 SCC 69, at para. 143 (S.C.C.). See also paras. 160-165, per Rowe J.
78
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those practical concerns.82 Legislators would not be “left in the dark,
possibly for many years” about legislation, any more than they might be
about any other legislation that raises constitutional issues and on which
they can seek and obtain legal advice.
He may instead have been motivated by an abstract desire to ensure
that courts not “supervise” the parliamentary law-making process.83
Consider that he is not averse to consultation by the Crown with
Indigenous Peoples; indeed, he recommends it:84
[There is] value and wisdom [in] consulting Indigenous peoples prior to
enacting legislation that has the potential to adversely impact the
exercise of Aboriginal or treaty rights.

It is important to note that this “potential to adversely impact” standard is
the test for the trigger of a duty to consult. In effect, Brown J. is saying
that the Crown should consult, but that a court will not make the Crown
consult, nor will it declare after the passage of legislation that the Crown
failed to consult. He recommends that the Crown consult (and so make
the effort to act honourably), but without guidance at any point from the
courts about how that consultation should proceed. In his view, then,
courts may not tell the legislature when it has acted dishonourably,
although they may tell the executive when it has acted dishonourably and
intervene directly to prevent it from doing so.
If and when a court considers the proposition that the Crown must act
honourably in parliamentary law-making, it will do so in relation to the
particular process of making a particular statute that had the potential for
adverse impact on, but ultimately proves not to infringe, section 35
rights. It will be a statute in respect of which the Crown did not consult
with holders of section 35 rights, or in some other way acted
dishonourably. The issue will be whether it is sufficiently important to
reconciliation that the court should provide guidance to the legislature
about what constitutes honourable law-making.85 The answer to that
question is highly fact-dependent, and difficult to answer in advance of
such a proceeding.
82
I presume that Karakatsanis J., having spent three years as Ontario Deputy Attorney
General and two as Secretary to Cabinet, was in a good position to judge their practical import.
83
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J.
No. 71, 2005 SCC 69, at paras. 103, 116 (S.C.C.).
84
Id., at para. 145.
85
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J.
No. 71, 2005 SCC 69, at para. 44 (S.C.C.). In this area of law “reconciliation and not rigid
formalism” is more important.
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(c) When Would Such a Duty Arise?
Justice Karakatsanis would consider it dishonourable to pass
legislation that may adversely impact section 35 rights, even if the
legislation ultimately does not have any adverse impact.86 This is
consistent with the duty to consult.87 The Indigenous community would
not have to prove the existence or content of section 35 rights, or show
that the legislation does in fact have an adverse impact on such section
35 rights. Such a standard recognizes that it may be detrimental to the
relationship where the Crown acts as if it does not matter that there might
be an adverse impact.
Justice Karakatsanis provided one example of legislative action that
might be dishonourable — the passage of legislation that removes future
Crown conduct that would otherwise trigger a duty to consult.88 For this
point she quoted from the Yukon Court of Appeal decision in Ross River
Dena Council.89 There the Court held that a statutory scheme which does
not allow for consultation or provide other equally effective means to
acknowledge and accommodate Aboriginal claims is “defective and
cannot be allowed to subsist”.90
(d) What Would the Duty Require?
As Abella J. noted, an obligation to act honourably in the passage of
legislation is “vague”.91 In broad terms, the Crown would have to
consider the section 35 rights that are at stake, how the proposed
legislation may impact on those rights, and whether to take any
opportunities to avoid, minimize, or mitigate such impacts. This would
likely involve some engagement with Indigenous Peoples.
In Mikisew Cree, Abella J. said that “[u]nilateral action is the very
antithesis of honour and reconciliation”.92 Justice Karakatsanis likewise
said that the duty to consult exists to prevent the Crown from “acting

86

Id., at paras. 3, 45, 52. See also paras. 136-137, per Brown J.
See for example id., at paras. 79, 84, 92, per Abella J.
88
Id., at paras. 30, 43, 46.
89
Ross River Dena Council v. Yukon, [2012] Y.J. No. 123, 2012 YKCA 14 (Y.K.C.A.),
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused [2013] S.C.C.A. No. 106.
90
Id., at para. 37; Mikisew Cree, at para. 46.
91
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J.
No. 71, 2005 SCC 69, at para. 84 (S.C.C.).
92
Id., at para. 87.
87
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unilaterally” in a way that undermines or erodes section 35 rights.93
Therefore a duty of honourable dealing would likely require that the
Crown talk with potentially adversely impacted section 35 rights-holders
about legislation before it is enacted. This comes close to a duty to
consult which, in its least technical definition, is talking together for
mutual understanding.94 Indeed, the Crown could look to processes that
satisfy a duty to consult, because in the terms in which the duty is
defined in Haida Nation, a satisfactory consultation process must uphold
the honour of the Crown.95 Regard could also be had to the constitutional
principle of reconciliation.96 We can perhaps draw on the majority in
Williams Lake who, although speaking about historical reconciliation of
interests by the Crown under its sui generis fiduciary duty, said that the
honour of the Crown required the Crown to “reconcile [the interests]
fairly”.97 Further, as noted above, Williams Lake may suggest that in
reconciliation of Indigenous interests, weight should be given to the
Indigenous perspective of what those interests are.
Current parliamentary processes, in particular parliamentary
committees, might provide an opportunity for the Crown to ascertain
Indigenous Peoples’ views on the potential for adverse impacts on
section 35 rights, with any adjustments to such processes that would be
necessary to uphold the Crown’s honour.

IV. FINAL REFLECTIONS
The cases leave one feeling slightly unsettled. Neither gives the sense
that the judges have amongst themselves a common, clear conception of
what reconciliation requires — of the direction of the reconciliation
project and how each case fits into it. In this manner, these cases
highlight the importance of the person — in this context a judge — to the
relationship between the Crown and Indigenous Peoples.

93
Id., at paras. 25-26, 43. The Court did not address the United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”), but it likely will not be long before the concept of
the honour of the Crown is guided in part by UNDRIP’s concept of “free, prior and informed
consent”.
94
Haida Nation, at para. 43 (S.C.C.).
95
See Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005]
S.C.J. No. 71, 2005 SCC 69, at para. 141 (S.C.C.).
96
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J.
No. 71, 2005 SCC 69, at paras. 66-67 (S.C.C.).
97
Williams Lake, at paras. 55, 110 (S.C.C.).
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However, the cases complement nicely, and it is possible to draw
some strands of hope from their juxtaposition. Williams Lake is about
having an efficient, effective way to resolve historical grievances;
Mikisew Cree is about how far courts should intervene to prevent future
grievances. Seeing the cases together makes it easier to draw some
conclusions about how the Supreme Court conceives of the honour of the
Crown and reconciliation.
In my view, these two concepts are inextricably tied together —
reconciliation is the purpose and the goal, and the honour of the Crown is
the means toward it. More specifically, the honour of the Crown
describes the standard of behaviour which the Crown must meet in order
to maintain a long-term, respectful relationship between Indigenous and
non-Indigenous Canadians. This view ties together two important
statements that the Supreme Court has made about reconciliation and the
honour of the Crown. First, it has said that the “grand purpose” of section
35 is the “reconciliation of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians in a
mutually respectful long-term relationship”.98 Second, it has said that the
objective of the duty to consult — which arises from and satisfies the
honour of the Crown — is “fostering reconciliation by promoting an
ongoing relationship”.99 The duty to consult is, in the words of Dwight
Newman and adopted by the Court, “[c]oncerned with an ethic of
ongoing relationships”.100 Since the duty to consult exists to satisfy the
honour of the Crown, it follows that the “ethic of ongoing relationships”
is the goal of the honour of the Crown.
The view I express above advances the conception of the honour of
the Crown suggested by Brian Slattery, who called section 35 a
“generative constitutional order” — a phrase also adopted by the
Supreme Court.101 In his conception, section 35, guided by the honour of
the Crown, is not merely static, identifying and protecting historical
98
Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, [2010] S.C.J. No. 53, 2010 SCC 53, at
para. 10 (S.C.C.). See also Mark Walters “The Jurisprudence of Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights in
Canada”, in Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir (eds.) The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural
Societies (Oxford University Press: 2008), advancing the theory of "reconciliation as relationship”.
99
Hamlet of Clyde River v. Petroleum Geo-Services Inc., [2017] S.C.J. No. 40, 2017 SCC
40, at para. 47 (S.C.C.).
100
Id., at para. 24, quoting Haida Nation, at para. 38 (S.C.C.) and D. G. Newman, The Duty
to Consult: New Relationships with Aboriginal Peoples (2009), at 21 (also quoted in Haida Nation).
101
Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown”, (2005)
29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 433, at 436. See also Haida Nation, at para. 38 (S.C.C.); Mikisew Cree First Nation
v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J. No. 71, 2005 SCC 69, at para. 87
(S.C.C.).
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Aboriginal rights, but is also dynamic, mandating a process of active
participation by the Crown and Indigenous Peoples in the identification
of Indigenous rights. I think the honour of the Crown does more than just
assist in the identification of rights, with any Crown obligations that arise
from the honour of the Crown being directed to that end. Perhaps a better
way to conceive of the honour of the Crown is that it creates obligations
not simply so that rights can appear out of a process of rightsidentification, but also for the purpose of the process itself, regardless of
whether rights result or not. The honour of the Crown requires it to
identify and then balance Indigenous interests with those of the broader
society whenever the Crown undertakes action that can adversely impact
those Indigenous interests. This process of identifying and balancing
occurs irrespective of whether there are or will be specifically-identified
rights arising from those Indigenous interests. This process occurs
because that is what is necessary for a mutually-respectful long-term
relationship. Not only then does the honour of the Crown give a standard
through which the Crown can maintain a mutually-respectful, long-term
relationship, but it ensures that this standard is met through procedural
obligations.
For the most part a process of identifying and balancing Indigenous
interests occurs in the present and the future. The role of the honour of
the Crown in such present and future processes is shown by the duty to
consult, the test for justifying infringements of section 35 rights, and the
proposition in Mikisew Cree discussed above that the legislative process
must be honourable. But courts and tribunals are also called on to assess
whether the process was met in the past. Reconciliation in a mutuallyrespectful long-term relationship requires the acknowledgment of
instances when the Crown has not met an honourable standard in the
past. As Mark Walters has noted, reconciliation can “involve acts of
repentance and forgiveness ... so that a line can be drawn under a
troubled past and relationships of social and political harmony may
flourish.”102 And as Kirsten Manley-Casimir has noted, no relationship
can prosper or be respectful without the parties addressing, on an
ongoing basis, their past relationship and taking responsibility for what
has occurred.103 The role of the honour of the Crown in assessing the past
102
Mark Walters “The Jurisprudence of Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights in Canada”, in
Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir (eds.) The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies
(Oxford University Press: 2008), at 183.
103
See Kirsten Manley-Casimir “Toward a Bijural Interpretation of the Principle of Respect
in Aboriginal Law”, (2016) 61 McGill Law Journal 939, 967.
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balancing of interests is seen in the sui generis fiduciary duty in Williams
Lake, as discussed above, and the Manitoba Metis case.
Williams Lake and Mikisew Cree are consistent with the idea that the
honour of the Crown gives a standard through which the Crown can
maintain a mutually-respectful, long-term relationship, and ensures that the
Crown meets this standard through the imposition of procedural
obligations. Williams Lake reinforces the sui generis fiduciary duty as a
means of assessing historic Crown action, and remedying — where
necessary — through equitable relief. Indeed, it could be argued that the
need for an equitable remedy is what distinguishes the existence and
breach of a sui generis fiduciary duty from the mere engagement and
breach of the honour of the Crown, as in Manitoba Metis. The proposition
advanced by Karakatsanis and Abella JJ. in Mikisew Cree that the Crown
must act honourably in the passage of legislation reinforces the desirability
of an honourable process of reconciling interests.
But these two cases also suggest that, in spite of the judicial recognition
and imposition of Crown obligations arising from the honour of the
Crown, courts should where possible play a limited role in advancing
reconciliation. I noted earlier the conclusion in Williams Lake that the
standard of review of Specific Claims decisions on the Crown sui generis
fiduciary duty is reasonableness. This is an interesting conclusion because
the sui generis duty arises from the honour of the Crown and, in Mikisew
Cree and elsewhere, the Court has described the honour of the Crown as a
constitutional principle.104 Indeed, it is hard to consider that the honour of
the Crown is not a constitutional principle, when it “arises …from the
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty”,105 and its purpose is to reconcile “the
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty and the prior sovereignty, rights and
occupation of Aboriginal peoples”.106 The Court in Williams Lake could
comfortably have determined that the Tribunal’s findings in respect of a sui
generis fiduciary duty were constitutional in nature and not entitled to
deference. Instead it acknowledged that assessment of satisfaction of a sui
generis fiduciary duty is a “heavily fact-based inquiry”.107

104
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J.
No. 71, 2005 SCC 69, at paras. 24, 42 (S.C.C.); Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation,
[2010] S.C.J. No. 53, 2010 SCC 53, at para. 69 (S.C.C.).
105
Haida Nation, at para. 32 (S.C.C.).
106
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J.
No. 71, 2005 SCC 69, at para. 21 (S.C.C.).
107
Williams Lake, at para. 92 (S.C.C.). See also para. 173.
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The Court’s decision that the Tribunal’s ruling on a sui generis fiduciary
duty was not constitutional in the terms contemplated in Dunsmuir suggests
two things. First, that the honour of the Crown does not involve, in this sui
generis fiduciary context, a constitutional issue in the sense of the
reconciliation of rights presently protected by the Constitution Act, 1982.
It is fair to conclude that the Crown fiduciary’s obligation to reconcile
Indigenous and non-Indigenous interests did not, in that past time, involve
balancing interests which were constitutionally protected in that sense.
Second, the Court’s decision suggests that deference to the Specific Claims
process is consistent with the honour of the Crown. I noted earlier the
statement by the majority in Williams Lake that a “just resolution of these
types of claims is essential to the process of reconciliation”.108 The Court
appears to be signalling that reconciliation and the maintenance of the
honour of the Crown require a specialized, efficient, means of resolving
disputes about the past that is outside of the regular court process.
Then in Mikisew Cree seven judges said that the honour of the Crown did
not require a duty to consult on the passage of legislation. This means that
maintenance of the Crown’s honour does not require courts to get involved
in the process of balancing Indigenous and non-Indigenous interests through
legislation while that process is underway. Five judges, however, appear to
support the ability of a court to say after the legislation has passed whether
that balancing of interests was done in an honourable way.109
So we can see in both Williams Lake and Mikisew Cree the Supreme
Court’s desire to stay out of the “nitty gritty” of reconciliation, where
possible, while still making sure reconciliation happens. The Supreme
Court is comfortable performing functions in Crown-Indigenous disputes
that are analogous to the functions it commonly performs outside of the
Aboriginal law context, such as judicial review of administrative action,
or of legislative infringement of constitutional rights. Perhaps outside of
these common functions the Supreme Court sees itself not as an actor in
reconciliation, but as an arbiter or, more accurately, not a referee with a
whistle, but a commentator with a keyboard. Williams Lake and Mikisew
Cree suggest that courts must apply the concept of the honour of the
Crown in a way that respects that difference.
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